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Abstract: We seek to understand both the incidence and the impact of the African political business 
cycle in the light of a literature which has argued that, with major extensions of democracy since the 
1990s, the cycle has both become more intense and has made African political systems more fragile. 
With the help of country-case studies, we argue, first, that the African political business cycle is not 
homogeneous, and occurs relatively infrequently in so-called µGRPLQDQW-SDUW\ V\VWHPV¶ where a pre-
election stimulus confers little political advantage. Secondly, we show that, in those countries where a 
political cycle does occur, it does not necessarily cause institutional damage. Whether it does or not 
depends not so much on whether there is an electoral cycle as on whether this cycle calms or 
exacerbates fears of an unjust allocation of resources. In other words, the composition of the pre-election 
stimulus, in terms of its allocation between different categories of voter, is as important as its size. 
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The African political business cycle: varieties of experience 
 
1.Introduction         
                 The idea that governments may wish, for political reasons,  to stimulate the 
economy before an election and thereby amplify the business cycle is frequently 
documented in the literature on industrialised countries (Kalecki, 1943; Nordhaus, 1975; 
Mosley,1978; Rogoff, 1990) and has spread, with democratisation, to emergent and 
developing countries. It has been discovered that the cycle often does not µEHKDYH¶ LQ
the same way in developing countries as in industrialised countries. For example, the 
policy instruments used to stimulate the economy in pre-election periods may be 
instruments such as the minimum wage or increased government expenditure on public 
works, rather than fiscal and monetary policy (Treisman and Gimpelson, 2001). Where, 
DV LQ VHYHUDO FRXQWULHVRI$IULFD WKHUH LVDQ LQFXPEHQW µGRPLQDQWSDUW\¶ RUGRPLQDQW
coalition), which is far ahead of rival parties in its share of the vote (for example, 
%RWVZDQD 8JDQGD 6RXWK $IULFD WKDW PD\ UHGXFH WKH LQFXPEHQW¶V LQFHQWLYH WR
administer a pre-election boost to the economy (Schultz, 1995) and the political 
business cycle may be less violent or even non-existent (Remmer, 1993)2.  
                    A further key inter-country difference, particularly in an African context, is 
that poor developing countries have weaker states than industrialised countries.  Block 
(2002) argues that in the context of democratisation the need to apply a pre-election 
boost for political reasons may impose severe strains on economic stability, especially if 
institutions are weak.  With reference to a panel of 44 countries over the period 1980-
95, Block warns that: 
 
               Africa, along with many countries in Latin America and the former Soviet Union, is currently 
engaged in long-term processes of economic and political reform. Yet, Africa is unique in the intensity of 
these dual challenges, as well as in its relatively limited institutional development. It is, in short, a context 
not only particularly ripe for political business cycles, but also one in which such cycles may imply 
particularly acute problems for the compatibility of economic and political reform. The electorally 
motivated macroeconomic interventions found in this paper directly undermine ongoing economic reform 
programs, which are predicated on reducing deficits, restraining money growth and inflation, and 
liberalising foreign exchange regimes and capital markets. Are economic and political reform friends or 
foes? (Block, 2002: 224)  
 
            This is a timely warning, and the literature has revealed a number of cases 
where the economic cycle in Africa has been amplified by the democratisation of politics 
(Tarawalie et al. 2012; Sackey and Compah-Keyeke, 2012, Ebeke and Olcer 2013).  
+RZHYHU%ORFN¶VFDYHDWFRQFHUQLQJ$IULFD¶VµUHODWLYHO\OLPLWHGLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW¶
is, we argue in this paper, very important. In fact, institutional development is highly 
variable across Africa, being in some places minimal but having in other places 
developed in a way, often under the stimulus of good relationships with aid donors, 
ZKLFKKDVVWUHQJWKHQHGWKHVWDWH¶VGHYHORSPHQWDOFDSDFLW\DQGGHPRFUDWLVHGLWDWWKH
same time. It is our contention that whether or not this institutional development has 
occurred is crucial in determining the impact of the political business cycle; and that this 
impact is reflected in the allocation of the pre-election boost between sectors and 
purposes which are or are not seen as fair and equitable. Our basic argument is that 
economic instability arising from a political business cycle will be mitigated if, first, 
donors enable post-election deficits to be indulged on soft terms rather than to lead to 
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shortage; and second, pre-election booms are spent on measures which seem to 
LQFUHDVHµIDLUQHVV¶DQGSUHYHQWWKHF\FOHLQWKHEXGJHWGHILFLWIURPWXUQLQJLQWRDF\FOHLQ
personal disposable income also.  Thus, whether economic and political reform are 
µIULHQGV¶RUµIRHV¶LQ%ORFN¶VVHQVHGHSHQGVZHDUJXHRQWKHGHJUHHRILQVWLWXWLRQDO
development and specifically on the inter-sectoral composition of the pre-election boost, 
if there is one. 
 
                       Our aim in this paper, then, is to examine the incidence of political 
business cycles in Africa in a manner which seeks to do justice to these inter-country 
variations in political and economic environment.  Our aim is first to understand whether 
an election-cycle mechanism is present in Africa, and if so where; secondly to 
understand the process through which the political business cycle is transmitted; and 
thirdly to understand the impact of the cycle, with particular reference to our hypothesis 
that the impact of the political cycle depends, as discussed above, on the composition 
of public expenditure between different interest groups. Section 2 presents the sample 
and illustrates some of the variations of experience by means of country case studies. 
In section 3 we examine the proposition that the political business cycle causes the 
quality of governance to deteriorate, and inflicts institutional damage: in particular, we 
suggest that the impact of the cycle may depend on the composition of any pre-election 
boost in expenditure. Section 4 concludes and presents implications for policy. 
 
   
 
 
  
                
2. Evidence of election-cycle effects in Africa 
 
                We wish first of all to understand whether an election-cycle mechanism is 
present in Africa, and if so where.  We therefore begin with a model in which the 
government varies its macro-economic policy instruments (It), notably the budget and 
the money supply, in an expansionary direction in pre-election years (PREELEi,t), but is 
then forced  to cut back on expenditure after the election in order to re-establish fiscal 
balance and prevent a run on the reserves3. We expect that this pre-election stimulus 
will be greater in those cases where the ratio of aid to GDP (AIDGDPt) is high, since aid 
KDV WKHDELOLW\ WR ORRVHQ WKH UHFLSLHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶VEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWDQG LQFUHDVH LWV
freedom of manoeuvre (in particular to provide a pre-election boost), and greater also in 
WKRVHFDVHVZKHUHWKHUHLVQRµGRPLQDQWSDUW\¶'i,t) since, as discussed above,  there is 
more incentive to offer a pre-election boost if the outcome of an election is uncertain 
and such a boost will influence the outcome of the election. Therefore we estimate, for a 
sample of 51 African countries, the following the following single-equation model4  : 
 
titijtiitit
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,,,,
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             (1) 
 
where: 
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It = policy instrument subject to variation in an election year; 
ELEi,t, = a dummy variable taking the value 1 in an election year and 0 in a non-election 
year; 
PREELEi,t = a dummy variable that equals 1 in a pre-election year, and zero otherwise; 
AIDGDPi,t = the value of aid disbursements as a proportion of GDP; 
Di,t = Dummies for presence of a dominant political party, and for positive growth in 
AIDGDP in the year following an election.  
GDPGi,t = GDP growth; 
j = length of lag applicable to pre-election stimulus; 
ȝ UDQGRPHUURUWHUP 
 
 
           This specification reproduces the essence of the original Nordhaus (1975) 
µRSSRUWXQLVWLF¶SROLWLFDOEXVLQHVVF\FOHPodel, in which the incumbent government 
stimulates the economy before an election in order to maximise its share of the vote at 
election time, The policy instruments considered are the budget deficit (total 
government revenue less total government expenditure), and money supply, both 
expressed as shares of GDP.  The aid-to-GDP ratio is added to the model to reflect the 
dependence of expenditure on aid flows, as discussed above. Table 1 shows a 
summary of the variables we use in our analysis. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Variables 
Variable description Obs Mean Std Deviation Data Sources 
Budget deficit (ratio of GDP) 
 
721 
 
-3.31 
 
5.16 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 
Election year dummy 
 
1262 
 
0.13 
 
0.34 
 
The African Elections Database; 
Quality of Government Dataset 
Pre-election fiscal stimulus (D = 1 if 
the government runs a budget 
deficit prior to a presidential 
election) 
1479 
 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
 
0.24 
 
 
 
The African Elections Database; 
Quality of Government Dataset 
 
 
Pro-poor expenditure 
 
99 
 
14.193 
 
4.756 
 
IMF, Government Expenditure 
Statistics Yearbook, various issues 
Government effectiveness (KK 
measure) 
661 
 
-0.711 
 
0.623 
 
Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
Tax to GDP ratio 
 
385 
 
18.469 
 
8.747 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 
ICRG bureaucratic quality 
 
910 
 
1.404 
 
0.94 
 
International Country Risk Guide 
 
Aid to GDP ratio 
 
1317 
 
12.43 
 
13.21 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 
GDP growth rate 
 
1360 
 
3.60 
 
7.32 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 
Dirty elections (D=1 if elections 
deemed dirty) 
1423 
 
0.69 
 
0.46 
 
Database of Political Indicators 
(DPI) 
Money supply (ratio of GDP) 
 
1291 
 
27.97 
 
18.40 
 
World Bank, World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM 
Pre-election monetary stimulus  
(Dummy = 1 if the government 
allows money supply to growth in 
excess of GDP growth prior to a 
presidential election) 
 
1261 
 
 
 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
 
 
 
The African Elections Database; 
Quality of Government Dataset & 
World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM 
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          We estimate equation (1) using the variables in Table 1, and the results are 
presented in Table 2, using a fixed effects (FE) estimator.5 The equation is estimated 
separately for the sample as a whole and for countries without dominant parties. 
Dominant parties are defined as those parties that manage to attain more than 60% of 
the vote in a given national election. Across the sample as a whole, the expected fiscal 
pre-election stimulus is strongly significant (at the 1% level) as a predictor of the budget 
GHILFLWHYHQLQWKHµQRGRPLQDQWSDUW\¶JURXSZKHUHZHH[SHFWHOHFWRUDOFRPSHWLWLRQWR
be more intense (at the 5% level of statistical significance).  
          The monetary pre-election stimulus is statistically significant for the full sample 
after controlling for country fixed effects (at 1% level of significance). On this evidence, it 
appears that political business cycles in Africa are triggered by both fiscal and/or 
monetary expansion prior to elections. Where there is greater political competition, 
incumbent parties are more inclined to increase the deficit level prior to an election than 
they are likely to increase money supply. This could be because it is easier to reverse a 
deficit than it is to control inflation arising from excessive monetary expansion. As noted 
by Block (2002) there appears to be evidence that the African election cycle is variable 
across, and possibly even within, African countries, and below we investigate the 
possible causes of this variance with the help of country case studies. 
 
Table 2: Preliminary evidence of election cycle effects 
 
VARIABLES 
Budget deficit 
Full sample 
(1) 
Budget deficit 
No dominant Party 
(2) 
Money Supply 
Full sample 
(3) 
Money Supply 
No Dominant Party 
(4) 
Lagged Budget deficit 0.359*** 0.139   
 (0.093) (0.194)   
Election year dummy 1.133 -0.462 0.794* 0.245 
 (0.686) (1.496) (0.447) (1.117) 
Fiscal pre-election stimulus -1.647*** -2.079**   
 (0.323) (0.996)   
Dirty election dummy 0.810 3.012** -0.190 0.793 
 (0.656) (1.294) (0.511) (1.104) 
Dirty election dummy x Aid/GDP -0.052** -0.251**   
 (0.024) (0.119)   
Aid growth in post-election year dummy 0.153 0.524 -0.455 -2.327* 
 (0.583) (1.789) (0.420) (1.180) 
Election dummy x Aid/GDP -0.010 -0.011 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.004) (0.017) 
Election dummy x budget deficit 0.487*** 0.297***   
 (0.098) (0.105)   
Aid/GDP 0.017 0.070 0.026 0.095** 
 (0.032) (0.068) (0.021) (0.041) 
GDP growth 0.035 0.045 -0.148*** -0.173*** 
 (0.035) (0.072) (0.035) (0.061) 
Lagged GDP growth 0.062** 0.048 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.029) (0.072) (0.054) (0.063) 
Lagged M2/GDP   0.827*** 0.709*** 
   (0.052) (0.110) 
Monetary pre-election stimulus   1.714*** 0.625 
   (0.530) (0.505) 
Election dummy x M2/GDP   -0.012 -0.015 
   (0.014) (0.021) 
Time fixed effects 0.085** 0.197* 0.034 0.183** 
 (0.040) (0.112) (0.028) (0.087) 
Constant -3.692*** -6.431*** 4.591*** 2.984 
 (0.932) (1.882) (1.393) (2.182) 
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Observations 541 163 975 315 
R-squared 0.337 0.132 0.681 0.567 
Number of countries 37 23 48 38 
F 39.68 7.373 42.81 19.67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. We only report the variables with some statistical significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).   
Sources:  election timings from Quality of Government Dataset; aid per capita from World Bank, World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM;fiscal dominance from Adam and McConnell (2006), Table 5; dominant party status from Salih (2003) and Quality of 
Government Dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 Our case-studies relate to Ghana, Zambia and Kenya - all countries in which 
multi-party competition for the presidency has been active since the beginning of the 
1990s, i.e. there is currently QRµGRPLQDQWSDUW\¶6.  The course of the political business 
cycle between 1980 and the present in these countries is depicted in Figure 1. There is 
an active cycle in Ghana and Zambia ± in the sense that in each election year there is a 
noticeable increase in the budget deficit, most of it triggered by variations in government 
spending rather than in the tax ratio. In Kenya, no cyclical increase in the budget deficit 
is observable, except in 2007.  In Ghana, as Figure 1 shows, this trend towards macro-
economic instability has recently got worse, and the 2012 pre-election boom (right-hand 
end of the graph) is a great deal worse than that for the 2004 and 2008 elections 
(although not as bad as in 1996 and 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Budget deficits and election cycles in case study countries 
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However, there are some puzzles still embedded in these data, not the least of 
which is that Zambia and Kenya, which made strenuous attempts to rid themselves of 
their fiscal deficits over the period 1990 to the present, experienced strained and 
unstable relationships with aid donors over the period7, whereas Ghana, whose fiscal 
control was much looser and which lived with an inflation rate averaging over 20% over 
the entire period, enjoyed an excellent and stable relationship with aid donors over the 
same period, interrelated with its anti-poverty performance ± indeed, Ghana halved its 
headcount poverty level between 1991 and 2006 (Nuamah, Teal and Awoonor-Williams, 
2010)8, a performance matched only by Uganda across the whole of Africa. We may be 
able to understand these puzzles if we bring into the story characteristics going beyond 
the formal observance of democratic and fiscal orthodoxy ± in particular, the quality of 
governance and of the pre-election boost that was applied in each of these cases. 
 
Ghana is perhaps the country that in the whole of Africa, since 1992, has made 
the most strenuous efforts to consolidate its advances in democratic practice, achieved 
inter alia through reforms in electoral practice, involvement of foreign observers in 
monitoring of elections and a drive to increase the electoral participation rate (Fridy, 
2007;  Branch and Cheeseman, 2008;  Whitfield, 2009). Each of the six elections since 
1992 has been tightly contested between the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and 
the New Patriotic Party(NPP), both of which have their roots in structures of regional 
and ethnic loyalty established in colonial times. At each of these six elections (won by 
the NDC in 1992 and in 1996, the NPP in 2000 and 2004, and by the NDC again in 
2008 and 2012) there is a perceptible pre-election boost in the budget deficit, as may be 
observed from Figure 1 (Government of Ghana 2011; Tarawalie et al. 2012; Sackey and 
Compah-Keyeke, 2012)9, and in each election the incumbent parties, respectively 
rooted in the (Ewe-speaking) south-east and  the (Ashanti) south-centre of the country, 
have aimed their pre-HOHFWLRQERRVWRXWZDUGVIURPWKHVHµVDIHVHDWV¶WRZDUGVUHJLRQV
and interest-groups in which they perceive themselves as having the biggest chances of 
picking up uncommitted votes. Very early in the 1990s, the poor Northern region was 
courted by the NDC, which connected it to the electricity grid and divided it into two 
administrative regions ( Upper East and Upper West regions ), since which time this 
area has become fairly safe for the NDC ( Fridy (2007), Abdel-Gafaru(2012))10; this 
leaves Greater Accra, Central and Western Regions as the key constituencies of swing 
voters for which the two main parties have contested (Fridy, 2007, especially maps on 
pp. 287 and 288; André and Mesplé-Somps, 2009; Whitfield 2009; Abdul-Gafaru 2012). 
Of these regions, Central and Western  contain quite a high proportion of low-income 
people11, and the fact that a high proportion of the pre-election expenditure increase in 
each of these years went to the health, education and social protection sectors, which 
have a high propensity to reach low-income groups (Table 3  below) enabled the pre-
election VWLPXOXVWREHPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\WDUJHWHGERWKRQµIORDWLQJYRWHUV¶DQG
uncommitted voters who in many cases had not previously voted or had voted for minor 
parties (Fridy, 2007, Whitfield 2008, Gyimah-Boadi 2009) ± to the benefit of the 
incumbent party ± and on low-income groups12 ± to the pleasure of the aid donors13. 
Delighted both by the improvements in governance and by the rapid fall in poverty from 
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RQZDUGVWKHGRQRUVGHFLGHGWRFRQGRQH*KDQD¶VSHUVLVWently slack macro-
economic performance ( especially in 2012 when claims on the budget were inflated by 
expected new revenues from offshore oil and when, because of low commodity prices, 
correction of the budget deficit proved hard to achieve)14 and in return  have rewarded 
WKH*KDQDJRYHUQPHQWZLWKKLJKDQGVWDEOHDLGIORZVZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKH,0)¶V
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (Table 2). +RZHYHU*KDQD¶VDLGVWDWXVLVQRZ
changing: in recent years, Ghana has been promoted from low-income to lower-middle-
income status, and at the time of writing (early 2015) a stand-by facility, on commercial 
terms, is being negotiated with the Fund. 
 
The case of Kenya is in many ways opposite.  As Figure 1 shows, no election-
year budgetary boost by the incumbent party is perceptible in any year except 2007 
(part of which is explained by the fact that the Central Bank of Kenya enjoys a high 
degree of independence, which has enabled it to exercise a restraining influence on 
aggregate demand and thence on all elements of expenditure). Judged both on the 
TXDOLW\RIHOHFWLRQVDQGRQWKHOHYHORIFRUUXSWLRQ.HQ\D¶VJRYHUQDQFHUHFRUGZDVSRRU
throughout the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi from 1978 to 2002; the gradual realisation 
of this by aid donors eventually motivated them to cool their previously warm 
relationships with the Kenyan administration. The 2002 election, won by the Kikuyu-led 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC; subsequently Party of National Unity, PNU) under 
the former finance minister Mwai Kibaki, promised progress in terms of inter-ethnic 
fairness, electoral propriety and a diminution of corruption, but before any of these 
advances had been properly embedded, or accepted as such by donors, they were 
thrown into reverse (Branch and Cheeseman 2008:15), and a claim by the opposition 
that the December 2007 elections (the one instance in which a pre-election fiscal boost 
is visible in Kenya) had been rigged led to widespread rioting between supporters of the 
two main parties in January and February 2008, with over 1000 deaths. As a result, a 
clear opportunity to create a Ghana-type situation of competition between two parties 
drawing their support from a national, rather than an ethnic or regional, base was 
thrown away. The fact that the most recent general election, in March 2013 (narrowly 
won by the Jubilee Coalition, the successor to the NARC and PNU) passed off much 
more peacefully clearly represents a new opportunity for evolution towards the kind of 
democratic competition for power that is visible in Ghana. But in important ways, the 
political atmosphere of Kenya still diverges greatly from that of Ghana: whereas the 
party structures of present-day Ghana are rooted in a seventy-year-old tradition, the 
.HQ\DQSDUWLHVDUHVWLOOµFRDOLWLRQVRIFRQYHQLHQFH«QRWGHVLJQHGWRGHOLYHU
VXEVWDQWLYHFKDQJH¶+DZNHDQGLQSDUWLFXODUQRWGHVLJQHGWRGHOLYHUDW
election times or otherwise, the kind of radical redistribution of income and opportunity, 
enabling political parties to transcend purely ethnic loyalties, that has been achieved in 
Ghana. Hence, in spite of recent rapid economic growth, poverty has fallen much less 
than in Ghana (Table 3), and the dialogue with donors has been much less warm.   
 
Zambia represents an intermediate case. During the early 2000s the ruling 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) lost its dominant-party status in face of a 
determined challenge from, in particular, the Patriotic Front (PF) led by Michael Sata.  
During this period there was also an improvement in the quality of elections, and the 
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2006 and 2008 elections were substantially cleaner than those of the 1990s and early 
2000s (Larmer and Fraser, 2007; Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2009:  69-70).  As inter-
party competition became more intense, so, as in Ghana, both parties found themselves 
seeking to transcend the existing ethnic base of their parties by competing for the 
support of uncommitted groups ± the principal battleground, in Zambia, being urban 
ZRUNHUVRQWKH&RSSHUEHOW:LWKLQWKLV]RQH6DWD¶V3DWULRWLF)URQWPDGHDSDUWLFXODU
SLWFKIRUWKHOR\DOW\RIDµFRDOLWLRQRIWKHGLVSRVVHVVHG«SXWWLQJWKHOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVRI
WKHXUEDQSRRUDWWKHKHDUWRISROLWLFDOGHEDWHV¶&KHHVHPan and Hinfelaar, 2009:  64). 
Especially during the run-up to the 2006 election (and within the pre-election boost of 
WKDW\HDUWKHUHVSRQVHRI3UHVLGHQW/HY\0ZDQDZDVD¶V00'ZDVWRVHHNWRHPXODWH
6DWD¶VSRSXOLVWDSSHDODQGLQSDUWLFXODUPDQ\RIKLVPRUe popular policies, including the 
idea of a windfall tax on copper, an increase in the royalty on mineral rights15,  a series 
of tax cuts and an attempt to capture the support of rural interests, especially through 
subsidies on fertiliser and other inputs, not very successfully targeted on lower income 
JURXSVµZKLFK0ZDQDZDVDDFFHSWHGZHUHDGLUHFWUHVSRQVHWR³FULWLFLVPRYHUKLJK
WD[HVGXULQJWKHHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ´¶&KHHVHPDQDQG+LQIHODDU$IWHUORVLQJ
the 2008 presidential election, forced b\0ZDQDZDVD¶VGHDWK6DWD¶VSRSXOLVWDSSURDFK
ILQDOO\WULXPSKHGDQG6DWD¶V3DWULRWLF)URQWQDUURZO\ZRQWKHSUHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQ
moving back towards the middle of the road, increasing the progressive mining royalty 
but not restoring the windfall tax, and toning down much of his anti-multinational and 
anti-Chinese rhetoric in the process ( Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 67;  Mineweb, 2013; 
Zambian Economist,  2013a, 2013b  )16.  
  Moreover, the adoption of this quasi-Ghanaian approach to inter-party 
competition, focussed on the uncommitted urban poor, has not yet achieved anything 
OLNH*KDQD¶VGHJUHHRIVXFFHVVLQEURDG-based, poverty-reducing development. 
Although the data are disputed, there is as yet no firm evidence that even after several 
years of growth poverty levels have come down from their very high levels of the 1990s. 
Observing this, and apparently not yet completely convinced that good governance has 
come to stay, the trusting donor-recipient relationships that are apparent in Ghana, 
although improving in recent years (DFID, 2012) have not yet arrived in Zambia, and aid 
flows are as a consequence lower and more unstable (Chiripanhura and Mosley, 2013). 
Indeed, the ratio of aid to GNP has more than halved, from double figures to less than 
5%, since the millennium. 
It is therefore possible to observe important differences between the ways in 
which the operation of two-party democracy has become embedded in a process of pro-
poor institutional change in the three case-study countries. Our argument will be that 
these differences are important for the way in which the political business cycle works in 
Africa. We argue that these differences are driven by three inter-related factors. Firstly 
the quality of governance and institutions, and second, the composition of public 
expenditure in general and the pre-election stimulus in particular, both impact on a third 
key causal factor, interrelationships with aid donors. We thus have the beginnings of an 
explanation of how the possible negative institutional impacts of the business cycle, 
about which Block and others have expressed concerns, may vary across cases. In the 
next section, we attempt a formal test of these ideas. 
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3. Institutional impact of the political business cycle 
   Several commentators on Africa, as discussed above17, have worried that the 
political business cycle might impose breaking strains on institutional capacity and 
possibilities for sustained reform. In particular, they have worried that pre-election 
surges in spending might prove difficult to reverse, thereby presenting African 
governments with an unpleasant choice between surrendering to the cycle and thereby 
wrecking fiscal discipline, or alternatively re-imposing that discipline so drastically that 
the state collapses into anarchy (which was the outcome of the political business cycle 
process, for example, in Sierra Leone in the 1980s)18.  Africa still has, of course, a high 
density of fragile states19, suggesting that the risk of increased state vulnerability from 
this cause is real; and of course, well short of state collapse, there is a good deal of 
evidence suggesting that increased volatility has welfare costs (Ramey and Ramey, 
1995:  Hudson and Mosley, 2008). Thus, if an amplified political business cycle 
increases overall volatility within a fragile economic system, and if increased overall 
volatility damages institutions, then there is cause for worry.  
 Do these worries apply in practice? Our case-study evidence suggests that even 
in those cases where the political business cycle aggravates fiscal instability, it may not 
damage institutional quality if aid donors are willing to finance pre-election booms on 
HDV\WHUPVDQGLIWKHERRPLVWKHQFKDQQHOOHGLQWRHJDOLWDULDQµSUR-SRRU¶SXUSRVHV
Specifically, in Ghana, a progressive orientation of public expenditure and a proactive 
determination to consolidate democratic electoral processes motivated donors to 
provide aid on terms which prevented the very active, indeed increasing over time, 
political business cycle in the budget deficit from turning into a cycle in personal 
disposable income.20 In Zambia, these trends also became apparent but much later in 
the day, in the mid 2000s, leaving donors agnostic about whether true improvements in 
governance were under way, so that the cycle in the budget deficit was mirrored in a 
cycle in personal disposable income. In Kenya, there is generally very little evidence of 
any cycle, and donors at most times had a poor relationship with the government, so 
that on the one occasion that a cycle did threaten institutional damage, in 2007, the 
donors were in no mood to put a protective safety-net around the economy, and one of 
the results was violence which took the Kenyan state to the edge of breakdown. 
On this view, the sequence of actions around the time of an election is important 
in determining the consequences of the cycle.  Governments, we argue, send signals to 
internal and external interest-groups (including aid donors) by means of their public 
expenditure allocations concerning the interest-groups which they identify with and 
concerning the principles by which they intend to arbitrate between conflicting claims 
(Hudson, Lenton and Mosley, 2011). These signals can be conveyed by shifts in 
expenditure around election time from budgets which are not easy to target on swing 
voters to those which are21, and amongst those which are targetable we identify, as a 
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group both politically uncommitted and important for political stability, the urban poor. 
Those African governments which have reoriented their public expenditure patterns and 
in particular their pre-election stimulus in a pro-poor direction, and moved towards fairer 
electoral processes, as Ghana and Zambia did in our illustrations, may be interpreted as 
sending a signal that they are attempting, in their expenditure allocations, to go beyond 
WKHHWKQLFDQGUHJLRQDOOR\DOWLHVRIWKHLUµKHDUWODQGV¶22, and to allocate expenditure on 
broader principles of equity.  
  
            Our hypothesis is, therefore, that in those cases where an election cycle is 
visible, its impact on the economy depends on the context of government behaviour 
around the election. Specifically, we expect that negative impacts of the political 
business cycle on institutions will be insignificant in those cases where the pre-election 
VWLPXOXVLVµSURJUHVVLYH¶LQWKHVHQVHRIEHLQJGLUHFWHGLQDPDQQHUWKDWLVJHQHUDOO\
pro-poor in intention rather than being aimed at the well-being of a specific ethnic or 
UHJLRQDOJURXSDQGZKHUHLWLVµFOHDQ¶LQWKHVHQVHRIEHLQJXQDFFRPSanied by ballot-
rigging. But they may be serious in those cases where a pre-election boost is perceived 
as aggravating rather than easing existing inter-personal and inter-ethnic unfairnesses 
in the distribution of power and assets. 
In Table 3, we examine this hypothesis in relation to an enlarged case-study 
group of eight African countries for which relevant data are available, including the three 
case-study countries of the previous section. The size of any pre-election boost is 
measured in the extreme left-hand column of the table. We wish to test the hypothesis 
that this will be influenced firstly by institutional quality, and secondly by the context in 
ZKLFKHOHFWLRQVDUHFRQGXFWHG7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVPHDVXULQJµLQVWLWXWLRQDO
TXDOLW\¶LQFROXPQV4 to 8 of the table, are five: 
 
(1) $µVWDWHIUDJLOLW\LQGH[¶7KLVLVFRQFHLYHGDVDPHDVXUHRIH[SRVXUHWRFRQIOLFW
in relation to the capacity of state institutions to manage that conflict. The 
capacity of state institutions to manage and anticipate conflict is taken from 
the POLITY IV index23 and measured on a seven-point scale, where 7 
GHQRWHVµH[WUHPHLQFDSDFLW\IUDJLOLW\¶¶DQGGHQRWHVµKLJKLQVWLWXWLRQDO
FDSDFLW\OLWWOHRUQRIUDJLOLW\¶RQWKDWLQGH[RIVWDWHFDSDFLW\$GGLQJWKH
exposure index to the state capacity index produces a 10-SRLQWµFRPSRVLWH
IUDJLOLW\VFDOH¶ZLWKWKHXSSHUH[WUHPHDQGWKHORZHUH[WUHPHZKLFKLV
the measure reported in Table 3.   
(2) Tax capacity, measured in terms of the tax/GDP ratio. This measure of 
institutional capacity has been widely used in quantitative studies (e.g. Moore 
1999, Brautigam and Knack 2004). It has the merit of distinguishing those 
cases in which governments are deterred by fear of political opposition or 
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incapacity of tax-collecting institutions from broadening the tax base from 
those cases in which these obstacles can be overcome. 
(3) 7KHµSUR-SRRULQVWLWXWLRQVLQGH[¶7KLVLVDPHDVXUHRIWKHFDSDFLW\RI
economic institutions not only to function effectively but also to develop, and 
in particular to enable low-income people to access key markets, including 
labour, capital and infrastructure. It is constructed (Mosley 2012, Table 6.1) 
as the average of the following indices: (i) access to microfinance as a 
proportion of the population; (ii) participation in rural labour markets as a 
proportion of the population; (iii) access to rural infrastructure as a proportion 
of the population; (iv) the Leftwich-Sen-WH9HOGHµVWDWH-business relations 
LQGH[¶/HIWZLFKHWDOFRQFHLYHGDVDTXDQWLWDWLYHPHDVXUHRIWhe 
extent to which the state is supportive of private economic institutions. 
(4) A measure of government effectiveness (the Kaufmann-Kraay or KK 
indicator)24 that measures how effective a government is in formulating and 
implementing policies. 
(5) The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) bureaucratic quality measure, 
which is SDUWRIDFRPSRVLWHLQGH[PHDVXULQJµLQVWLWXWLRQDOTXDOLW\¶RIDFRXQWU\
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). The bureaucratic quality measure has a high 
correlation with the government effectiveness measure above (77%). 
 
In addition, we hypothesise that the impact of the pre-election boost will be 
determined by the political context of elections, for which we provide measures in 
columns (2) and (3) of Table 3&ROXPQVSHFLILHVWKHµSUR-SRRUH[SHQGLWXUHUDWLR¶
defined as the ratio of health, plus education, plus social expenditure, less military 
expenditure, to total expenditure. The first three expenditures in this ratio are typically 
intensive in the labour of low-income workers and in addition have many low-income 
consumers (especially in the case of primary health and education); military expenditure 
by contrast is capital-intensive and its level is associated with an increase in the 
probability of conflict25 (Nafziger and Auvinen 2000:  Tables A 3.1 to A3.4). We 
therefore reason that a large pre-election boost which increases the ratio of pro-poor 
expenditure to total expenditure will be treated as a signal of commitment by incumbent 
governments to allocate public money in a manner that is broadly equitable rather than 
reflective of existing ethnic and regional partisanship (which will strengthen loyalty to 
public institutions), whereas a pre-election boost which decreases the ratio of pro-poor 
expenditure to total expenditure will do the opposite26. Our other measure of electoral 
context, in column (3), is a measure taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
LQGH[RIZKHWKHUWKHHOHFWLRQVIRURXUVHOHFWHGFRXQWULHVZHUHµFOHDQ¶RUµGLUW\¶LQWKH
sense of being characterised by electoral irregularities and rigging27.   
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Table 3: Election cycles and their institutional consequences  
 
Sources and notes. 
 (column 4) State fragility index: This is conceived as a measure of exposure to conflict and the capacity of state institutions to manage that conflict. Exposure to conflict is transcribed 
from the PRIO ucdp_loc index on the scale 3=war, 2= intermediate conflict, 1= minor conflict, 0 = no significant civil conflict. The capacity of state institutions to manage and anticipate 
conflict is taken from the POLITY IV index28 and measured on a seven-SRLQWVFDOHZKHUHGHQRWHVµH[WUHPHLQFDSDFLW\IUDJLOLW\¶¶DQGGHQRWHVµKLJKinstitutional capacity/little or no 
IUDJLOLW\¶RQWKDWLQGH[RIVtate capacity. Adding the exposure index to the state capacity index thus produces a 10-SRLQWµFRPSRVLWHIUDJLOLW\ 
VFDOH¶ with 10 the upper extreme and 0 the lower extreme, which is the measure reported in the table. 
(column 6) Pro-poor institutions ratio:  is constructed (Mosley et al 2009: Chapter 6, table 6.1) as the average of the following indices: (i) access to microfinance as a proportion of the 
population; (ii) participation in rural labour markets as a proportion of the population; (iii) access to rural infrastructure as a proportion of the population; (iv) the Leftwich-Sen-te Velde 
µVWDWH-EXVLQHVVUHODWLRQVLQGH[¶/HIWZLFKHWDOFRQFHLYHGDVDTXDQWLWDWLYHPHDVXUHRIWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHVWDWHLVVXSportive of private economic institutions. 
(column 10) Poverty headcount: from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM. 
 
 Election-cycle characteristics Dimensions of  state fragility, 1990 to 2008 
 
(9)Average aid/ gross 
national income ratio 
1990-2008 (IMF Poverty 
Reduction and Growth 
Facilities(PRGF)in 
parentheses) 
 
(10) Poverty 
headcount,1990 
to 2008 
 (1)Election
-year 
deficit as 
%  of 
mean 
budget 
deficit 
 
µ3UR-SRRU¶
content of 
expenditure 
in election 
year 
(3)Dirty/ 
clean 
elections 
(4)State 
fragility 
index 
(5) Tax/ 
GDP ratio 
(6)Pro-
poor 
institutions 
index 
(7) ICRG 
Bureaucratic 
quality measure 
(1990-2008) 
(8) Government 
effectiveness (KK 
Indicator), 1996-
2011 
Ghana 156.4 8.0 Clean since 
1992 
 
7          5 
 
11         22 
106       
185 
2.7            2.5  
-0.11       -0.03 
Average 9.1% (on falling 
trend;Two PRGFs) 
 
51           27 
Zambia 185.0 6.0 Dubious 
until 2001, 
clean 
thereafter 
 
7          5 
 
19         17  
.. 1,0           1.0  
-1.06       -0.65 
Average 19.5% (on 
falling trend) 
68           60 
    
Kenya 77.6 5.6 Dirty except 
in 2002 
 
7          4 
 
18         18 
100        
128 
3.0           2.0  
-0.34       -0.54 
Average 7.0% (on falling 
trend) 
 
42           46 
Botswana 183.3 13.2 Clean  
3          2 
.. .. 3.0           2.0  
0.47         0.53 
Average 3.8% (on falling 
trend) 
30           13 
South Africa 79.5 6.9 Fairly clean 
since 1994 
 
 
3          2 
 
21      22 
.. 
 
4.0           2.0  
0.88         0.37 
Average 0.3% (on falling 
trend) 
 
24           16  
Ethiopia 152.0 1.8  Mixed; 
notably dirty 
in 2005 
 
6          6 
 
7       15 
.. 0              1.5  
-1.28         -0.4 
Average 9.8% (on rising 
trend) 
 
63           37   
Nigeria 127.3 0.4 Generally 
dirty 
 
7          6 
 
11       10 
.. 2.0            1.0  
-0.98       -  1.12 
Average 1.1%(on rising 
trend) 
 
54            62 
Uganda 88.8 3.5 Moderately 
clean 
 
6          6 
 
5         12 
100       
164 
0               2  
-0.73         -0.51 
 Average 12.1% (on 
falling trend; 
 Two PRGFs) 
 
56            33 
Sample 
average 
(n=8 countries) 
131.6 5.2  5.8       4.5 11      17 .. 1.97         1.75 -0.39          0.29 7.8% 49.          37 
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 The political business cycle mechanism is only found in some countries, which are 
shaded in the first column of Table 3. The main inference that we derive from examining 
these countries is that the political business cycle will damage institutional development 
if and only if government policy is perceived as aggravating existing inequities.  In 
Ghana, Zambia and Botswana, where the pre-election stimulus is strong, pro-poor 
H[SHQGLWXUHLQHOHFWLRQ\HDUVLVKLJKDQGHOHFWLRQVLQ=DPELDVLQFHDUHµFOHDQ¶
state fragility decreases and institutional development improves over the measurement 
period. In Nigeria, where the pre-election stimulus is strong and the pro-poor 
expenditure ratio very low, state fragility and institutional development as a whole 
worsen as indicated over the measurement period29.  In the four cases mentioned 
DERYHWKLVDUJXPHQWDSSOLHVWRERWKWKHµVWDWHIUDJLOLW\¶DQGWKHµWD[FDSDFLW\¶PHDVXUHV
of institutional development. This conclusion is further supported by the scattergrams 
presented as Figure A1 and the regression presented as Table A2 of  the online 
appendix, which report no evidence of a damaging effect of the electoral cycle on 
institutions. 
 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
          The African political business cycle emerges from this analysis as country-
specific, and not universal. In some countries, under dominant- party systems, there is 
no need for it, since the incumbent can reasonably expect to be able to win elections 
without it; and in others, where the central bank is able to impose binding constraints on 
budgetary expansion, it is not feasible.  Averaged across all African countries, a pre-
election stimulus, we find, is still a feature of the political landscape. But there are wide 
variations around this central tendency, which it has been the main purpose of this 
paper to investigate. 
In the context of fragile economic systems, which most African countries are, the  
fear has been expressed that the extension of democracy, specifically by means of the 
political business cycle, might damage institutional development and make the state 
more fragile still. Across the sample as a whole, we find that this fear is unfounded. 
There are individual cases, (such as Nigeria in Table 3), where the qualitative evidence 
suggests that a negative relationship between pre-election stimulus and measures of 
institutional development is apparent but across the sample as a whole, no significant 
relationship is perceptible between the pre-election stimulus and institutional quality, 
whatever measure of institutional quality is used30. 
           In Africa at least, we argue, the course of the political business cycle appears to 
be intimately connected with the perceived fairness according to which the political 
game is conducted, and also with the perceived equity with which state expenditures 
are allocated. Donors have the power, through their aid allocations, to influence both of 
these.  We predict that where the composition of the pre-election stimulus is pro-poor, 
institutional damage from a pre-election stimulus is unlikely to result. In terms of our 
measures of institutional quality, this prediction is fulfilled. 
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In those cases where, with the help of reforms in electoral procedure, elections 
have become more transparent and the allocation of state resources has become more 
pro-poor (Botswana and Mauritius in the 1970s and 80s;  more recently, with donor 
support, Ghana, Rwanda, Mozambique and Zambia) the surges in expenditure which 
occurred prior to elections  can be seen as an institutional asset rather than a liability, 
as they have been mainly pro-poor expenditures, which have then become embedded 
in the budget thanks to donors bestowing their blessing,  and not had to be cut back in 
the post-election years . Indeed, in several poorer LDCs where the right chemistry forms 
between donors and recipients, a virtuous circle can be observed in which aid donors, 
favourably impressed both by improvements in anti-poverty performance and in 
governance, help to counter-balance the political business cycle by establishing stable 
long-term aid contracts, of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) type. 
In Africa, as the literature has stressed, the political business cycle has the 
potential to impose additional strains on already vulnerable institutions. This represents 
a distinctive threat to institutional capacity, not often encountered in industrial countries. 
Yet, in many African countries, we find that these risks have not materialised. Rather 
those countries have been able, often in synergy with aid donors, to improvise 
institutional buffers against those risks. One of those buffers ± the design of pro-poor 
expenditure patterns, ZKLFKVHQGDµGLVWULEXWLRQDOVLJQDO¶WRLQWHUHVWgroups ± is an 
innovation that, potentially, may also have relevance outside Africa. 
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  In this sense, and in the sense that per capita income levels are around the African average for all countries in the 
case-study sample, this selection of countries may be seen as representatiYHRIWKHJURXSRIFRXQWULHVµZLWKDQ
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WDEOHEHORZZHUHPRUHVWDEOHWKDQWKRVHRIWKHRWKHUWZRFRXQWULHV 
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$GDPDQG2¶&RQQHOOWDEOH2QWKH
*KDQDJRYHUQPHQW¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKHEXGJHWDU\RYHU-run, see IMF(2014) 
15
 These increased taxes on natural resources were explicitly aimed at increasing investment in the social service 
sector (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009: 65). This linking of export taxation and social services expenditure, 
explicitly framed as a gesture towaUGVJUHDWHUILVFDOHTXLW\LVYHU\UHPLQLVFHQWRIVLPLODUµQHR-GHYHORSPHQWDOLVW¶
initiatives in Latin America during the 2000s ± notably in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela ± where 
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export taxes have also been aimed at deriving a political dividend IURPDIDLUHUUHDOORFDWLRQRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VQDWXUDO
resources (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2009: Chapter 1).  
16
 The copper windfall tax, abolished by the MMD government between 2008 and 2011, was restored in the  
amended form of an increase in copper royalties by the Sata government in 2012, with the proceeds once again 
directed towards health and education in low-income areas ( Mineweb, 2013 ). At the most recent election, held in 
-DQXDU\IROORZLQJ6DWD¶VGHDWKWKHUHZDVDJDLQYLJRURXVPXOWL-party competition, amid which the MMD, the 
previously dominant party, fell away to a small percentage of the vote. 
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 6HHSDJHDERYHVHHDOVR&KXDZKRµJRHVDVIDUDVWRVXJJHVWWKDWHOHFWLRQVLQPRVW$IULFDQFRXQWULHV
should be postponed until a suitable socio-HFRQRPLFFRQWH[WFDQEHGHYHORSHG¶%UDQFKDQG&KHHVHPDQ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 For the detail of the Sierra Leone case, see  Weeks (1991) 
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 2QWKH3ROLW\,9PDSZKLFKSURYLGHVDPHDVXUHRIµVWDWHIUDJLOLW\¶RXWRIFRXQWULHVFODVVLILHGE\3ROLW\,9
DVKDYLQJµKLJK¶RUµH[WUHPH¶OHYHOVRIIUDJLOLW\DUHLQ$IULFD7KHLQGH[LVGLVSOD\HGDW
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
20
 Ghana was a relatively rare case of donors achieving a countercyclical pattern of aid flows. Empirically it has 
been common for donors to provide aid in a manner which amplifies rather than damping the cycle (Bulir and 
Hamann 2003, 2008,  Hudson and Mosley 2008) 
21
 Many thanks to Vera Troeger for emphasising this point to us. For a model which also argues that compositional 
effects may be important in determining the effectiveness of the pre-election boost, see Drazen and Eslava (2010). 
Our own approach was conceived independently of the Drazen-Eslava model and uses a different measure of  
µIDYRXUHGFRPSRVLWLRQRIJRYHUQPHQWH[SHQGLWXUH¶IURPWKHLUV,QRXUPRGHOWKHµSROLWLFDOO\VHQVLWLYHH[SHQGLWXUHV¶
which are prioritised ahead of an election are pro-poor expenditures; in theirs, infrastructure expenditures are 
prioritised (Drazen and Eslava 2010: (14)). 
22
 That is, in Ghana, the Ewe provided the traditional heartland of the NDC and the Ashanti of the NPP), and in 
Zambia, varied ethnic groups of the Copperbelt region provide the heartland of the MMD and the Bemba the 
heartland of the Patriotic Party. 
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  The Polity IV index is displayed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
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 This is available at www.govindicators.org. 
25
  The index which Nafziger and Auvinen use to assess the risk of civil war combines the ratio of military 
expenditure to GNP, as defined above, with a dummy variable for military government into a measure which they 
FDOOµPLOLWDU\FHQWUDOLW\¶WKLVLQWKHLUGDWDVHWLVSRVLWLvely and significantly associated with the likelihood of 
conflict. 
26
 Although we argue here that pro-poor expenditure is a useful signal of the perceived fairness of government 
expenditure, it is by no means  perfect, as intentions to allocate money fairly are often frustrated by imperfect 
H[HFXWLRQ$V.HHIHUDQG.KHPDQLDUJXHµEURDGSXEOLFVHUYLFHVPRVWLPSRUWDQWWRWKHSRRU± health and 
education ± DUHDOVRWKHVHUYLFHVPRVWYXOQHUDEOHWRWKRVHGLVWRUWLRQV¶ 
27
 This indicator is not ideal as a measure of quality of democracy, and in particular it interrelates, in dominant party 
systems, with the character of the dominant party, as discussed on page (5) above. 
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  The Polity IV index is displayed at  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
29
 For a discussion of the 2007 Nigerian election in this context, see the paper by Rawlence and Albin-Lackey 
(2007).  Nigeria is one of the African countries where the quality of growth, in the sense of the failure of growth to 
bring about poverty reduction, has been worst: over the last ten years, growth has run at an average of 6.5 per cent 
per annum, but poverty has increased, by up to 25% according to some measures (Mosley, 2013) 
30
 For a recent analysis arriving at the same conclusion,  but using a broader range of measures of institutional 
capacity, see the paper by Prichard(2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
